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The first hundred days in office have become a 
benchmark for every new government. Early in 
May, the Tsipras coalition government will reach 
this date. Given the difficult financial, economic 
and social situation in Greece, there was no such 
thing as a closed season for Alexis Tsipras from 
day one on, and he himself could not have 
expected one. After all, his new government 
acceded office with a political agenda demanding 
nothing less than an end to austerity and the 
submission to a reform programme seen as 
unduly imposed on Greece by its creditors, the 
EU and the IMF. 
Nevertheless, it was astonishing to see how quick 
his government isolated itself in the way the 
negotiations for receiving better terms on the EU-
IMF bailout agreements were conducted. 
Ultimately, even Obama requested Athens to 
speed up negotiations and initiate the reforms in 
tax collection, labour markets or the pension 
system previous Greece governments had 
committed themselves to in turn for the 245bn 
Euro in credits Greece has been receiving since 
2010. 
Even this finger wagging has not clinched a deal 
and thus makes it highly unlikely that the last loan 
worth 7.2bn Euros of the second bail-out package 
will be released anytime soon. Accordingly, 
speculations are flying high of how Greece will 
avoid to default when it has to serve its IMF debt 
in May. 
Against this backdrop, we are asking Loukas 
Tsoukalis, President of the Hellenic Foundation 
for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), to 
share with us his take on the first hundred days 
of the Tsipras government and what he thinks will 
follow next. 
Let us start with a background question. Is 
Greece so different from other countries of 
the Eurozone, and what can explain the rise 
of a radical left party to power in coalition with 
right wing nationalists? 
It is indeed a strange combination that only a big 
crisis can produce. The governing coalition has 
been brought to power on a wave of protest 
against austerity policies and foreign 
interference. Sure, this protest carries with it 
strong populist undertones. But you need to 
remember that in the course of the adjustment 
programme since 2010, the economy has 
imploded (25% loss in GDP and 27% rate of 
unemployment). And so has the Greek political 
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system. Greeks have suffered a dramatic decline 
in their incomes, an increasing number among 
them are in despair, and they all feel humiliated 
having been subjected to endless moralising and 
being told what to do, often in the form of diktat, 
and in excruciating detail. 
But this painful adjustment was necessary, 
was it not? 
As a member of the Eurozone, Greece lived for 
years on borrowed time and money having 
access to ample and cheap credit. The country 
was mismanaged. It accumulated debts, lost its 
competitiveness and came to the brink of 
bankruptcy after the crisis reached Europe. It was 
bad, extreme if you prefer, although not unique.  
 
Since 2010, Greece has been the beneficiary of 
two large rescue programmes from its European 
partners and the IMF. The biggest bulk of money 
lent to Greece has gone to service and repay old 
loans. Greece also benefitted from a partial 
restructuring of the debt held in private hands in 
2012, thus giving enough time to foreign creditors 
to offload much of their Greek sovereign debt 
holdings. Greece was saved and so were those 
foreign banks that had lent Greek governments 
large amounts of money without stopping to think 
how this debt could ever be repaid. 
In exchange, Greek governments have been 
asked to deliver on a highly ambitious (if not 
unrealistic) programme of front-loaded fiscal 
consolidation combined with a wide range of 
reforms. Having to deliver fiscal adjustment of the 
order of 15% of GDP in five years while also 
being asked to change everything from public 
administration to the labour market and closed 
professions, tax collection and the pension 
system in conditions of financial strangulation at 
home and prolonged economic recession in 
Europe would have been difficult (perhaps 
impossible?) in the best run countries. Insufficient 
ownership of the adjustment programme by the 
Greek political class has combined with the 
general incoherence of European governance 
and a deeply flawed economic strategy based on 
austerity in times when the private sector is 
deleveraging across Europe. It is not just a Greek 
problem, although the Greek problem is distinctly 
worse than others. 
How do we have to read the negotiating style 
of the Greek government with its lenders? Is 
it applied game theory where the first to blink 
loses it all? Or does it merely express the 
lacking of a plan or experience or both? 
It is both a matter of substance and style. I believe 
there is substance in the arguments put forward 
by the more sober members of the new 
government in Greece concerning the 
(non)sustainability of the debt and the excesses 
of austerity, also about some of the more 
ideologically loaded reforms. But the way they 
have gone about presenting their case has been 
really disastrous: lack of diplomatic skills and the 
capacity to translate words into numbers coupled 
with much cacophony and a real expertise in 
antagonising others. They obviously have little 
experience and understanding of European 
realities. The socialisation process is therefore 
bound to take time – and it will be painful for all 
sides concerned. 
What could such a compromise look like? 
Where do you see room for manoeuvre left on 
the side of the EU given that the other 
programme countries, i.e. Spain, Portugal 
and Ireland would certainly not like to look 
foolish after having implemented the entire 
reform agendas of their respective bail-out 
programmes? And more importantly, how 
and where could we expect Tsipras to 
compromise on the reforms demanded by the 
EU without antagonizing and losing out on his 
party and his voters? 
It is, of course, absurd to argue that the new 
government in Greece can impose its popular 
mandate on its European partners. But it is 
equally absurd and dangerous to argue that 
elections make no real difference to economic 
policy, alternatively that everything has gone fine 
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so far in Greece and elsewhere in Europe and 
that we just need to persevere. Some room 
needs to be found for legitimate differences of 
opinion. Europe cannot operate on the basis of 
the one and only truth. 
The new government in Greece needs to commit 
to a primary surplus in the budget, although not 
at the totally unrealistic levels envisaged in the 
adjustment programme. It needs to improve tax 
collection and make the pension system 
sustainable. It should, however, be given a much 
wider room for manoeuvre on other issues, 
notably reform of the labour market. In a country 
that has already gone through a large internal 
devaluation, insisting on further liberalisation of 
the labour market borders on the ideological. I do 
not agree that wholesale reform in a member 
country can be imposed by stealth from Brussels, 
or any other capital for that matter. It would be 
terrible for democracy and the European project 
as well. 
Can the Greek Prime Minister deliver on a 
reasonable compromise? At best, he will need 
time to learn and sort out allies from opponents 
within his own party and beyond. This can only 
be done in stages. The trouble is there is little 
time because the state coffers are fast running 
out of money and commercial banks of deposits. 
It is often difficult to reconcile economic time with 
political time. Looking beyond the immediate, I 
think that a further realignment of political forces 
in Greece may be inevitable, indeed highly 
desirable.   
In stark contrast to its relentless fight against 
the EU austerity agenda, what strikes many is 
that the Syriza party with its leftwing and even 
outright communist ideological background 
has thus far not taken on the oligarchs who 
are seen by many as responsible for this kind 
of state capture that has led Greece down. 
Why is it that Tsipras has not worked on 
taxing the rich and cut back on their 
privileges? 
Greece is a country with clientele politics, a 
relatively ineffective welfare system, many 
inequalities and vested interests. I repeat what I 
have said before: Greece may be extreme in 
some respects, although certainly not unique. 
The new government could make a real 
difference, if only they could go about it in an 
organised and non-dogmatic fashion. Alas, the 
early signs are not encouraging. They still spend 
an inordinate amount of time negotiating (or 
pretending to negotiate) with their European 
partners while trying to massage domestic public 
opinion. As for dogma, there is plenty of it in this 
government. Hopefully, the clash with reality will 
produce positive results assuming there is still 
time. 
What is the reason that despite the internal 
devaluation, which should make Greek 
products more competitive in the markets, 
other than in Portugal, Ireland or Spain Greek 
exports have not increased? Does Greece 
have a development problem rather than just 
one of economic reform? 
The current account has improved dramatically 
and it is now in surplus. But this has been mainly 
the result of the collapse in imports, following the 
collapse of domestic demand. The impact on the 
current account has also been the result of a 
large increase in earnings from tourism. The 
Greek economy is basically a service economy 
with shipping and tourism as the big 
breadwinners. It is also an economy consisting 
predominantly of small enterprises geared 
towards domestic consumption. It needs to 
become more outward looking and attract 
investment. Greece is certainly not a basket 
case. For several decades, it had enjoyed high 
rates of growth that enabled her to join the world 
top league in terms of standards of living. Its main 
assets are location, history and brainpower. If 
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